2. Chalcedonians and Monophysites

[ This is the second of eleven chapters out of John Meyendorff's Christ in Eastern Christian Thought ]

Synopsis of the Chapter
Unfortunately, the new distinction between φύσις and ὑπόστασις that Chalcedon introduced proved to be a catalyst for further misunderstandings, which can be categorized into four groups:

1. Dyophysites: These theologians remained faithful to Antiochene Christology and considered Chalcedon a post humous victory for Theodore of Mopsuestia - and a partial disavowal of Cyril of Alexandria.
2. Monophysites: Considered Chalcedon a return to Nestorianism. Rejecting the council they retained Cyril's formulation "one single incarnate nature of the God-Word" which undoubtedly consisted of "two natures" (εκ δύο φύσεων).
   
3. Neo-Chalcedonians: This group saw the council as not disavowing Cyril but merely condemned Eutyches. By saying "one hypostasis" Chalcedon was seen as upholding Cyril's argument against Nestorius.
4. Leontiusites: None of the above groups were able to rectify the terminological problems created by the Chalcedonian definition. In the first half of the sixth century, armed with Origenist metaphysics, Leontius of Byzantium (et al.) forged ahead with a creative effort towards a solution.

"The period between Chalcedon (451) and the beginning of Justian's reign (527) was dominated by a fruitless debate between the Monophysites and the strict Dyophysites." In the Chalcedonian corner was Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrus, who, as a friend of Nestorius, openly opposed not only Eutyches but also Cyril. "His refutations of the Twelve Anathematisms and the Council of Ephesus were remembered by everyone" (p. 31). He rejected any notion of theopaschism, believing that it was only Christ's human body, not his soul or divinity, that was resurrected from the dead. Significantly, Theodoret identified the single hypostasis defined by Chalcedon with the concept of a single πρόσωπον (prosopon, face). The choosing to ignore the way Chalcedon used hypostasis to explain prosopon caused further confusion.

Patriarch Gennadius of Constantinople (458-471), in his opposition to Cyril's Anathematisms, translated essential terms in such away that strict Cyrillians could not accept (p. 33). Gennadius avoided the term Θεοτόκος (theotokos) and ὑπόστασις (hypostatic union). His successors to the patriarchal see, namely Acacius, were forced under political duress to later betray Chalcedon.

The political duress gave way to the theopaschite controversies of the first years of the sixth century under Patriarch Macedonius (495-511), who was a rigid Chalcedonian. The Chalcedonism of the Acoemetae, the main adversaries of Monophysitism during the first part of the sixth century, was also an Antiochene interpretation of Chalcedon (i.e., contra Cyrillian interpretations). Pope John II would later decree the Acoemetae to be Nestorians (p 35-6).

So we see the rise of the Antiochene school, with Theodoret at the helm, over against its chief competition that had been in the Alexandrian school headed by Cyril. Monophysite theologians saw Nestorianism in these Antiochene articulations and consequently viewed the Council of Chalcedon as Monophysite, "in spite of the fact that the Council anathematized Nestorius and exalted the memory of Cyril" (p 36). The surest of Nestorianism for these Monophysites was the denial that 'the incarnate Word suffered in the flesh.' So theopaschism became the litmus test.

Ironically, the Chalcedonians continued to identify φύσις (fusis) and ὑπόστασις (hypostasis) which were two terms between which the Council had made definitive distinction. Joseph Lebon's Monophysitism identified Severus' doctrine of incarnation as essentially Cyrillian Christology. What must be kept clear is that Cyrillian Christology does not imply Eutychianism. "The debate between Antioch and Alexandria begun at the time of the Council of Ephesus was merely continuing as if the councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon had not taken place" (p 37).

Timothy Aelurus gives us the simple logic of the Monophysites of the time: "if there are two natures, there are also necessarily two persons; but if there are two persons, there are also two Christs" (p 38). Flowing from this premise, the Monophysites argued that if Christ's humanity was only such 'by economy' and not 'by nature' then his humanity was transitory and imaginary and thus resulted in Nestorianism. We can see this in the following quote from Philoxenus:

The Word was not changed into flesh when he took a body from it, and the flesh was not transformed into the Word's nature when it was united to it.

Philoxenus considers Christ fully human and although his position has an Apollonarian origin, he refuses to interpret it in this sense and asserts against Eutyches that Christ is consubstantial with us (humanity).

This seems to beg the question, "How can we say that Christ was in possession of his own body, soul and spirit?" Severus answers by saying that Christ's single nature possesses all the natural qualities (ἰδίοώματα) of humanity (p. 40). He argues that before the incarnation the Word was a simple nature; however, after the incarnation the Logos became composite in regard to the flesh (σύνθετος πρός τήν σάρκα). For Severus Christ is without a doubt made "out of two natures" (ἐκ δύο φύσεων); however, the union of the two natures results in a transforming into one nature. Severus, out of faithfulness to Cyril, refused to say "two natures after the union [of the incarnation]" because Cyril never said it, consequently leading him to a Monophysite rigor that Cyril never had (p 42).

Following Aristotle, Severus' one nature had only one ἐνέργεια (energy, activity). "This is why the formula in the Tome of Leo on the active properties of each nature -- agit utraque form cum alterius communione quod proprium est -- taken over by the Chalcedonian definition, 'each nature keeping its own way of being,' was for the Monophysites most difficult to admit. In their eyes two energies meant two beings; thus, the hypostatic union reduced to an illusion (p 42). In response Severus made a distinction between ἐνέργεια and ἐνέργηθέντα (works), referring to what is done by the activity.

In this way, Severus was attempting to reconcile the Chalcedonian and Monophysite positions. However, in denying that Christ's human existence was in terms of φύσις (nature) or ἐνέργεια (activity) he begged the question: Is "a human nature without human energy a true human nature?"

The Antiochene interpretation of ὑπόστασις as a mere synonym of πρόσωπον (face) did not demonstrate for the Monophysites that Chalcedon had remained true to Cyril of Alexandria. The hypostasis, according to the Council, was the 'point where the particularities of the two natures meet' and consequently the Council did not say that the hypostasis of the union of Christ's two natures was the pre-existent hypostasis of the Logos.

Chalcedonians responded by invoking the Trinitarian terminology of the Cappadocians. Both Chalcedonian and Severian orthodoxy proclaimed that Christ was consubstantial to the Father in his divinity and consubstantial to humanity in his human nature (p 45). However, the invocation of the Cappadocian formulations for the Trinity proved problematic. Severus would argue that in identifying essence and nature in Christology would presuppose that the whole Trinity had become incarnate!

At the end of the day, a specifically Byzantine theology provided the Church with the elements of a genuine solution, consisting in a new awareness of the hypostatic union. "This re-interpretation of Chalcedon played in relationship to the council a role similar in all aspects to the role the Cappadocian Fathers played in relationship to Nicaea" (p 46).